By Bertin Martens, Uwe Mummert, Peter Murrell, Paul Seabright, Elinor Ostrom
This e-book analyzes the institutions--incentives and constraints--that consultant the habit of individuals all for the implementation of reduction courses. whereas conventional functionality experiences are inclined to concentration virtually completely on rules and associations in recipient international locations, the authors examine incentives within the complete chain of firms thinking about the supply of overseas relief, from donor governments and enterprises to experts, specialists and different intermediaries. They research incentives inside of donor businesses, the interplay of subcontractors with recipient companies, incentives inside of recipient state associations, and biases in relief functionality tracking structures.
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Extra resources for The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid
To summarise, this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on multiple agents, and the literature on multiple principals. Section 3 discusses the nature of multiple tasks and describes a model due to Dewatripont et al. (2000). Section 4 outlines the main model of this paper. Section 5 concludes. 2. M U L T I P L E A G E N T S A N D M U L T I P L E P R I N C I P A L S The costs of delegation One of the main ﬁndings of the principal–agent literature is that in the presence of asymmetric information between the principal and the agent there will be unavoidable costs of delegation of a task – costs over and above the minimum necessary to compensate the agent for the effort of undertaking the task in the ﬁrst place.
The nature of the contractor, whether a non-proﬁt NGO or a proﬁt-seeking consultancy, affects project implementation. Nonproﬁt contractors may be inclined to forgo contractual rents in order to achieve a reform agenda; for-proﬁt contractors are not. It may thus be better to contract implementation of institutional reforms to NGOs that specialise in the issue at hand. This suggests that important project implementation decisions will be in the hands of the implementers, those working on the ground.
G. g. output- or results-related) monitorable tasks are complementary and equally important for the overall performance of aid programmes, management will have to ensure that incentives for easily monitored tasks are less high-powered in order to avoid agents diverting effort away from less easily monitored but still important tasks. Reality is often different however. Careers are often built on demonstrating good performance in more easily monitorable tasks, such as ‘committing and spending budgets’.